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Abstract: This paper examines the struggle economists in interwar Australia 
faced in coming to terms with new ideas on economic philosophy and whether 
they, in fact, registered upon Commonwealth economic policy. After being 
unusually great in 1931, with the Premiers’ Plan, the significance of economists 
waned as political complacency, brought about by the recovery itself, took over. 
Economists reasserted their influence, however, by the mid-1930s. This triumphant 
view of economists, however, finds little corroboration in Boris Schedvin’s study of 
the depression in Australia, which quickly succeeded in changing the perception of 
Australian interwar economists, and their contribution to policy, from triumph to 
ineptitude. This paper rehabilitates the work of Australian interwar economists, 
arguing that they not only had an enviable international reputation but also 
facilitated the acceptance of Keynes’s General Theory among policymakers before 
their counterparts did in the Northern Hemisphere. 
 
Introduction 
In the history of economic ideas there was a time, a brief interlude, when Australian 
economists came to the attention of their international counterparts. Australia in the 
interwar years sometimes resembled a laboratory for economic experiment. 
Australian economists were already influential in tariff-setting, economic 
development and wages policy. The Brigden report on the Australian tariff drew 
praise from the likes of Keynes and Taussig. However it was the Premiers’ Plan of 
1931, with its promise of constructive deflation as a means of economic readjustment, 
that provoked the most comment. The Australian Plan, as it was sometimes called, 
was hailed as an appropriate and uniquely improvised contribution to anti-depression 
policy. Keynes praised it, and the four economists principally behind it, for having 
‘saved the economic structure of Australia’ (Keynes 1973b, p. 95). The economists 
concerned were D.B. Copland, Dean of the Faculty of Commerce at Melbourne 
University; his colleague, L.F. Giblin; E.O.G. Shann from the University of Adelaide; 
and his predecessor, L.G. Melville, who became the Commonwealth Bank’s first 
economic adviser. Before 1939 it was widely accepted that Australian economists 
were not only instrumental but also quite correct in putting forward the Premiers’ 
Plan to rescue Australia from total economic collapse (Corden 1968, p. 58; Dow 
1937; Goodwin 1974, pp. 231-2; Hall 1938). It was only in the heyday of postwar 
‘hydraulic Keynesianism’ that intellectual recrimination and revisionism began about 
the value of the Premiers’ Plan. Colin Clark, one of the most prominent economists in 
Australia during the later 1930s, was critical of the Premiers’ Plan. He accused his 
senior colleagues, with the exception of his mentor, J.B. Brigden, of sheepishly 
following public opinion in opting for balanced budgets, regardless of the state of the 
economy (1958, pp. 222-3). 
In 1951 a somewhat penitent Douglas Copland, the chief architect of the 
Plan, looking back over the 1930s, admitted that ‘the mistake was made of not 
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recognising clearly enough that government activities needed to expand 
tremendously to offset the fall in private spending’ (1951, pp. 21-3). Copland also 
perceived errors in the conduct of economic policy, first in opposing monetary 
expansion, and second, and perhaps more forgivably, in seeing the depression 
purely in monetary terms (1951, p. 22). He remained adamant, however, that if it 
had been too drastic an adjustment in costs ‘... it was a mistake in degree rather than 
principle’ (Copland 1951, p. 23). In his last retrospective upon the Premiers’ Plan, 
L.F. Giblin suggested that ‘heavy unemployment was the inevitable price of 
national solvency’ (a view candidly shared by Melville in personal communication 
with the author). Giblin went on to defend the plan, claiming ‘that it was not far 
from the very best that was possible with a public inexperienced as it was at that 
time in violent economic vicissitudes and their remedies’ (1951, p. 81). There the 
issue stood until the publication of Boris Schedvin’s book Australia and the Great 
Depression (1970) put to an end to the heroic image of economists assiduously 
propagated by Copland. Schedvin critically questioned not just the role of 
economists’ advice but also the actual effectiveness of the anti-depression 
economic policy that they helped formulate. Thereafter the Premiers’ Plan became 
regarded in history textbooks as a terrible mistake, a case of misguided economic 
policy. The reputation of the men who devised it also became tarnished. The 
purpose of this paper is to repudiate both that conclusion and the book that 
contributed to that sentiment becoming established. Not only did Australia in the 
1930s prove to be the ‘utopia of practical economists’ (Goodwin 1974, p. 236), but 
it also embraced the philosophy of Keynesianism with relative ease. 
The Economists and the Premiers’ Plan: The Interwar View 
Copland claimed that Australia was one of the economies ‘first in and first out’ of 
depression.1 While the first half of that statement is indisputably correct, the second 
half is much more contentious. There is little debate, however, about the factors 
that caused the depression to hit Australia in the late 1920s. During that decade, 
Australian governments had undertaken a frenzy of developmental infrastructure 
works financed by loans from London. High opinion in London, from Montagu 
Norman to Keynes, looked askance on the scale of borrowing. Local economists, 
too, echoed these concerns about the indulgent rate of public spending, even if 
some of it would ultimately facilitate the rise of new manufacturing industries. 
When primary produce prices began to slip, making it increasingly difficult for 
state governments to service and repay their loans, the London capital market 
compounded their embarrassment by closing itself to any further Australian 
borrowing. The deterioration in the terms of trade, coupled with the cessation of 
long-term borrowing, spelt an immediate loss in national income of some ten per 
cent in one year alone (Copland 1934). Trying to increase export revenue as a way 
out of the crisis was ruled out because the global economy was, by this time, in the 
maw of depression. There were three ways in which Australia could react: default 
and some form of moratorium upon paying its foreign debt, financial reconstruction 
administered from London, or economic rehabilitation. To the credit of Australian 
policymakers only the last option was considered feasible. 
In his account of the episode, Copland argued that Australia followed two 
distinct phases of policy response to the depression. The first was an experimental 
stage in which authorities, lacking both cohesion and direction, tackled the crisis 
from a short-term view. In the more lasting ‘battle of the plans’ phase, and 
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thereafter, the federal government reluctantly called in the economists (Copland 
1934). The four economists previously mentioned, were well-versed in giving 
practical advice to governments (Groenewegen and McFarlane 1990). The 
ideologically conservative pair, Shann and Melville, were both engaged in advising 
the two most powerful banks in the land, the Bank of New South Wales and the 
Commonwealth Bank respectively, the latter being Australia’s nascent central bank. 
The Melbourne University men, Copland and Giblin, were economic 
stabilisationists not totally swayed by the virtues of deflation as Melville and, to a 
lesser extent, Shann were. The quartet decided early on to minimise their 
philosophical and policy differences in order to come up quickly with a scheme to 
restore budgetary equilibrium for Australian governments within three years. 
In brief, the Premiers’ Plan entailed three measures: a cut in government 
expenditure, a cut in interest rates, and the use of temporary deficit finance via 
Treasury Bills. In his copious writings on the plan, Copland always saw it in a 
much broader light, incorporating the earlier measures, taken elsewhere, to both cut 
real wages and devalue the Australian pound (Copland 1934, 1937). He saw the 
plan as achieving three things. First, it took the process of financial rehabilitation 
out of the political arena. Second, it put to death the inflationary schemes of price 
stabilisation being put about by monetary heretics within the Scullin Labor 
Government. And, third, the plan put Australia upon the road to a controlled 
deflation by adjusting her internal prices and costs in line with the fall in overseas 
prices. However the devaluation, together with the monetisation of the deficits, 
gave some stimulus to the economy. Melville insisted that these measures, together 
with the earlier increase in tariff levels ordered by the Scullin Government, gave 
local manufacturing an intentional boost (Melville 1971). In other words, the 
economists had, at the back of their minds, some notion of increasing Australia’s 
import replacement capacity as a means of escaping the external constraint. 
For Copland, the Premiers’ Plan marked the mobilisation of economic 
expertise in the higher realm of policy making, even if office-holders did not at first 
realise it. He told Irving Fisher that ‘Our economists and monetary advisers knew 
pretty well what they wanted, but I am quite sure that neither the Treasury 
authorities nor the Commonwealth Bank Board quite appreciated the nature and 
importance of the experiment they were conducting’.2 In other words, it would be 
too much to claim that the authorities were wittingly practising a well-balanced 
expansionary policy, especially when it involved unorthodox measures. Copland 
never doubted the true authorship of the plan. Billed by Neville Cain as ‘the public 
relations man of university economics’, Copland saw the plan as a means of 
increasing the usefulness of economic advice, if not also advancing his own career 
(Cain 1980, p. 3). The Harvard economist, Frank Taussig, saluted him: ‘Your own 
part gives one hope that after all, we economists are not so entirely useless as some 
of the critics allege’3. Moreover Copland always took an extremely positive and 
expansive view of what the package actually entailed as well as the role of 
economists in carrying it through. Indeed Melville probably had Copland in mind 
when he reflected that some proponents of the Plan ‘got a little hysterical about 
how good it was’.4. To Melville’s eye, the plan was all about regaining budgetary 
balance, preventing capital flight and mastering the external debt problem, without 
driving the economy into the ground: ‘I think perhaps we were a little 
Machiavellian about this. We thought that the proper way to get results was to talk 
deflation and inflate like hell, as a matter of tactics, particularly with the 
Commonwealth Bank Board.’5 
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Copland, the political economist, par excellence, realised that dire 
circumstances brought economic advice to the fore. As he told the New Zealand 
Finance minister, Downie-Stewart: ‘The early severity of the crisis forced drastic 
methods upon us and we were perhaps fortunate in not being in a position to make 
a deliberate choice. No doubt we would have failed to have taken the drastic action 
that we did’6. After the dust had settled Copland confided to Taussig that the 
Australian economists’ ingenuity in masterminding the country’s economic 
rehabilitation was only one side of the story. As he put it, ‘it has been uncommonly 
successful, but it has been greatly helped by a run of good seasons. Whether we 
shall continue...depends more upon the courage we show and the psychology of the 
people than upon actual economic efforts themselves. If it succeeds it will at least 
establish the principle that ‘intelligent economic control’ is capable of handling a 
difficult situation with great advantage to all concerned’.7 
Copland gathered fame from the leading role he played in formulating the 
Premiers’ Plan. In 1936, for instance, he was invited to Harvard University’s 
Tercentenary celebrations, where he was rewarded with an honorary doctorate for, 
as he put it, ‘recognition of the work the Australian economists have done for 
Australia over the past six years’8. While impressed on an earlier trip to America by 
how their economists honeycombed the federal administration, Copland was 
critical of the Roosevelt administration’s approach to solving the depression by 
increasing wages rather than using monetary policy. His Harvard address, entitled 
‘The State and the Entrepreneur’, was apparently not well received by some. 
Copland bemoaned to a Melbourne colleague: ‘Most of the economists (in the US) 
fail to see the necessity for social control and they spend their time beating the air 
about the interference of the Government with the economic law’9. 
An earlier honour for Copland was an express invitation from Keynes to 
give the 1933 Marshall lectures at Cambridge University.10 Copland took that 
opportunity to declare that the deliberate policies put in place by the 
Commonwealth Government were in part responsible for Australia’s economic 
recovery (Cain 1980, p. 3). The overriding theme in the lectures, which were later 
published (Copland 1934), was that in facing a difficult price-cost problem 
Australia’s economic institutions – the Arbitration Court, Loans Council, 
Commonwealth Bank and Tariff Board – allowed the economy to respond flexibly 
to the crisis. A unique middle road was taken, encompassing both cost cutting and a 
modest monetary expansion (Copland 1934, p. 69). In his lectures, Copland retold 
the story of how Australian economists had, from May 1930 onwards, played a 
prominent part in framing remedial policies. This was some achievement in a 
country said to despise scientific economics (Hancock 1930, p. 86). Economists 
wore that opprobrium, having made themselves distinctly unpopular in the 1920s 
by warning against over-exuberant public spending. 
The fact was, however, that Australian economists had begun to make 
inroads into government via the medium of committee work. In 1928, for instance, 
economists advised the Bruce-Page Government on the economic rationale for the 
Australian tariff, a practice Jacob Viner, while critical of the committee’s findings, 
felt was worthy of imitation by other nations. Economists also had input into the 
Development and Migration Commission and other Committees of Inquiry (Cain 
1973, pp. 79-80). The growing sense of professionalisation within economics was 
helped, too, by the placement of economists within the Commonwealth’s public 
service from 1933 onwards (Petridis, 1981, p. 406). There was also the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission, established in 1933 to inquire into matters of 
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economic equity between the states, largely at the behest of Giblin and Frederic 
Eggleston, a polymath who became its first Chairman. Australia’s centralised 
wage-setting process, too, afforded a clear advantage in that it allowed an enviable 
degree of money wage flexibility in time of economic duress (Reddaway 1938, 
p. 335). The interaction between the Australian Loans Council and the 
Commonwealth Bank was also a ‘guarantee’ that a moderate policy outcome would 
be forthcoming (Copland 1937, p. 422). 
Australian economists were influential not only because the general public 
had lost faith in its politicians, but also because they deliberately set out, unlike 
their British counterparts serving on the Economic Advisory Board, to be a small 
cohesive group with a fair degree of authority (Maclaurin 1936). Second, and just 
as important, the public statements made by economists struck a chord with the 
people11. Non-partisan ‘experts’ might deliver Australia from the crisis better than 
any meddling politicians could (Nicholls 1992). As Grenfell Price, an Adelaide 
historian, put it: ‘if ignorant politicians meddle in the delicate science of finance 
millions will undergo appalling sufferings’ (cited in Nicholls 1992, p. 211). That 
they did, cemented the standing and prestige of interwar Australian economics. 
Richard Downing, then an economics student, captured the excitement of being 
taught by Copland and Giblin. They arrived ‘to give their lectures straight from 
down-town meetings, and keeping us up-to-date with their day-to-day negotiations 
with governments and businessmen about depression, recovery…We were bred to 
the world of affairs, public policy and applied economics which they brought to the 
Melbourne school’ (Downing 1971, pp. 466-7). 
Not all, of course, welcomed the intrusion of economists upon the national 
scene. F.L. McDougall, the economic adviser at Australia House in London, agreed 
with David Rivett, Head of the Commonwealth Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research, that the economists had ‘lost their heads’ with their new-found 
sense of importance. Sounding more like an aggrieved banker than the 
Government’s chief scientist, Rivett explained how economists had come to 
prominence: ‘My interpretation of the position is that the homo economicus 
Australiensis was a neglected species up to 1929. Then when depression broke 
upon us the harried politician hurried to him for aid and since that date your 
Giblins, Coplands, Shanns and Melvilles have been taken very seriously indeed. 
This sudden promotion of men whose experience in public affairs is limited seems 
to me to have had an unsettling effect upon their mental equilibrium’ (cited in 
O’Dea 1997, p. 67). Someone else who also felt the economists had risen above 
their station was the indefatigable former NSW Premier, Jack Lang. In his 
recollection of the depression Lang devoted a chapter to Copland, incorrectly 
labelling him the ‘torchbearer’ for Niemeyerism (1962). 
That aside, the overriding contemporary impression in the 1930s was that a 
small core of economists had pulled Australia back from the brink (Goodwin 1974; 
Maclaurin 1936). At the time Australian economists were universally hailed for the 
role they played in the crisis. At the Ottawa Imperial Trade conference in 1932, for 
instance, Shann reported: ‘On all sides we are greeted by the remark that Australia 
has made the best stab of all at keeping her economy liquid and active’12. 
D.H. Robertson had Sweden and Australia in mind when he wrote: ‘There are said 
to be, in the far north and far south, lands where economists all give the same 
advice, where the Government listens to it, where the public understands why the 
Government has listened...’ (1940, p. 122). An Australian economist at Oxford, 
Robert Hall, believed the Premiers’ Plan to set a marvellous example of what 
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cohesive economic advice could achieve (Hall 1938, p. 120). Ralph Hawtrey felt 
that the Australians had anticipated the United States by seeking recourse from a 
brains trust (1934, p. 1). Even Keynes told one of his prize students, W.B. Reddaway, 
to spend some time in far-off Australia because there they listened to their economists 
(Tribe 1997, p. 77). Nigel Davenport, who penned the weekly Toreador column in 
the New Statesman and Nation, felt that the Australian government was unique in 
heeding the advice of its economists.13 
Rupert Maclaurin, a young American scholar on a fellowship from 
Harvard University, writing on Australia’s economic recovery for his dissertation, 
agreed with Copland’s premise that, while needing some ration of luck, a small, 
open, pastoral-based economy could take measures to escape the slump (1936). He 
might have been helped to his findings by the fact that he was chaperoned and 
introduced to key players in the drama by Copland. More intriguing, however, was 
Maclaurin’s view, seized upon later by Boris Schedvin, that Australian economists 
had, in fact, played only a spasmodic part in formulating recovery policy: ‘...the 
economists were used only in a haphazard fashion. That is to say, they were called 
on only on special tasks and with a particular problem to report on. And where they 
tried to broaden the bases of their inquiries in order to make their work more 
effective, governments not infrequently were resentful. Economists never had an 
opportunity to make a report on an entire economic program’ (1936, p. 257). In 
other words, economists were never allowed full latitude in the policy advice they 
could convey to the Commonwealth. Despite this admission, the contemporary 
perception was that economists had indeed played a significant part in composing 
an economic plan that helped rehabilitate the Australian economy. Remarkably, 
Maclaurin’s book remained the only in-depth study of the depression and its 
aftermath in Australia until the arrival of Schedvin’s account. 
A Contrary View of Things 
The publication of Schedvin’s book re-opened the debate over both the genesis and 
the economic soundness of the Premiers’ Plan in dealing with Australia’s debt and 
deflation problem. The central thesis of Schedvin’s book was that ‘...deliberate policy 
measures were comparatively unimportant in influencing the nature of the contraction 
or the speed of recovery’. This view related to his other major finding, that ‘Because 
imports fell more heavily than did national expenditure, the depression encouraged 
the shift of resources to the manufacturing sector; and it was on the basis of import 
replacement of manufactures that recovery was forged’ (1970, p. 372). This did not 
totally square with how economists in the 1930s had perceived the factors driving the 
recovery process. They attributed it not just to public investment and the rise of 
manufacturing but also to the rise in business confidence stemming from the 
budgetary measures taken, together with the salve of rising wool prices. 
Schedvin’s book was not just a detailed narrative of the origins and impact 
of the depression, but also, and more importantly for our purposes, a study in the 
making of economic policy at the time. Its origins sprang from a doctoral 
dissertation from the University of Sydney entitled ‘Economic Policy in Depression 
and Recovery in Australia 1927-1935’. While ostensibly a work in economic 
history, its focus upon the making of economic policy necessitated some inquiry 
into the ideas of economists. However, Schedvin undertook only a cursory 
examination of that aspect of the problem, possibly because he advanced the thesis 
that economic policy was, for the most part, market-driven. Economists, therefore, 
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hardly mattered in the making of policy. The Board of the Commonwealth Bank 
and the other trading banks, together with a pliant Australian Loans Council, had 
prevailed over economic policy. 
The recovery process, just like the responses to Australia’s economic 
crisis, was essentially endogenously driven. Schedvin believed, therefore, that there 
had been much mythology about how the Plan was composed and ultimately put 
into place. It was not a case of deliberate economic policy urged on by ‘experts’ or 
economists, but rather responses that mirrored what would have been market 
outcomes. To that extent, the Premiers’ Plan and the moves made upon wage levels 
and the exchange rate deserved little of the effusive praise that Copland and his 
contemporaries had showered upon it. 
To Schedvin, ‘The Premiers’ Plan was merely the embodiment of a series 
of expedients designed to maintain external solvency. The plan was not conceived 
as a means to promote recovery, nor did it do so in any tangible way. The view that 
the Premiers’ Plan was the foundation of Australia’s recovery, that it represented a 
judicious and deliberate mixture of deflation and inflation is a figment of Sir 
Douglas Copland’s imagination’ (1970, p. 7).14 Since the policies set out in the 
Premiers’ Plan were essentially reactive and market-driven, Schedvin argued, 
economists were ciphers in the policy–making process; their primary function was 
to embroider the fabric of the Plan into a ‘shroud of technical competence and 
expertise’ (1970, p. 374). In short, where Copland sought to magnify the influence 
of economists upon policy, Schedvin sought to minimise it. 
The germ of this minimalist view of economists and economic policy 
during the Great Depression came from Schedvin’s doctoral supervisor, S.J. Butlin 
from the University of Sydney15. In his history of the Australia and New Zealand 
Bank, Butlin suggested that the measures that emerged from the ‘battle of the 
plans’ – for example, exchange depreciation and wage cuts – were actually ‘the 
traditional responses of the free market’. He claimed that the so-called ‘planning’ of 
1930-32 ‘was directed not to novel policies but to traditional ones dictated by 
inherited ways of thought; it represents rather the inevitable political process by 
which conflicting interests were finally brought to compromise, not a resolution of 
significant differences in policy’ (1961, p. 390). In short, the Premiers’ Plan was 
really a cosmetic exercise to disguise the primal political forces at play. Butlin 
dismissed the Premiers’ Plan as merely invoking the simple national income 
welfare economics in Edwin Cannan’s text Wealth but ‘watered down’ to the level 
of common discourse (Butlin 1948, p. 40). His austere view of the contribution of 
economists to public policy was, in turn, probably sparked by his long, close 
friendship with the historian, John La Nauze. In May 1937, La Nauze had written 
an article entitled ‘Economic Theory and Practice’, in which he argued that the 
actual influence of economists upon the shaping of public policy was vastly 
exaggerated, and sought to deflate the high-blown reputation of economists in 
rendering public service to their country in times of need. La Nauze concluded: ‘In 
Sweden apparently economists enjoy the confidence and esteem of the public; in 
Australia, for a short time, some sections, at any rate, of the intelligent public were 
ready to believe that those who studied economic affairs might have some useful 
advice to offer upon there…On the whole it is unfair to say that economists are not 
regarded with relish by the public or even the intelligent majority of the public in 
most countries of the world today. They are sometimes listened to in Royal 
Commissions or similar bodies of inquiry; but with very few exceptions their 
advice or opinion finds no expression in government policy’16. 
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This went very much against the folklore about Australian economists at 
the time. La Nauze’s provocative manuscript was never published nor is there 
evidence he ever sought to do so. As editor of the Economic Record, Copland 
might well have rejected the thrust of La Nauze’s contribution, since he firmly 
believed that economists could improve public policy. 
Given this antecedence, Schedvin probably went further than his mentor by 
castigating Australian economists for failing miserably ‘to work towards the 
building of a positive policy in the later depression years, when this task was the 
preoccupation of overseas economists. When they should have been questioning 
traditional modes of thought, they clung to the myth of the efficacy of the Premiers’ 
Plan and implicitly condoned thereafter the inept policies of the Lyons 
Government. There was nothing remotely comparable in Australia to the vigour of 
the New Deal or the Cambridge intellectual revolution’ (1970, p. 225). Nor did 
Schedvin find any evidence of an intellectual hunger for experimentation within 
academe: ‘There is nothing in Australia which even approximates the widespread 
intellectual reconsideration of traditional doctrines which occurred overseas’ (1970, 
p. 374). This, Schedvin alleged, was because the major economists were not 
prepared to abandon the Premiers’ Plan. This was certainly true up to 1932, when 
the economists pinned their hopes upon a further devaluation to create room for 
more domestic expansion via public works. When, however, this advice was 
rejected – due to the dominance of Sir Robert Gibson over the Commonwealth 
Bank Board – Giblin and Copland urged public stimulus even if it jeopardised both 
Australia’s external account and her foreign exchange reserves. Closely following 
Butlin’s line of thinking about the weight of inherited thought, Schedvin 
maintained that even if economists had had heterodox notions in their head, they 
were, in any case, quite powerless. Australia’s economic parameters were governed 
by strong external and internal pressures. 
Apart from Melville’s protests, both in his verbal recollections of the 
period and in his review of Schedvin’s book (Melville 1971), the aspersion upon 
the value of Australian economists during the 1930s has largely stood intact. The 
Australian economists who reviewed Schedvin’s book took issue with his primary 
findings above the nature of the recovery process but did little to repudiate his 
claims about the alleged lacklustre performance of their profession in this decade 
(Boehm 1973; Forsyth 1972; Hancock 1971). Only Arndt (1971) assessed the 
advice of his adopted Australian forebears in any sympathetic light. 
It was generally believed, therefore, that Australian economists had 
indeed performed poorly in the depression. In a reappraisal of the events of 1931, 
Sinclair argued that ‘Australian governments had some freedom of action and 
failed to choose the fiscal action appropriate to the highest attainable level of 
employment’ (1974, p. 58). He concluded that the timing of Premiers’ Plan 
proved abysmal, in that the moment of external crisis had passed when the policy 
of sharp reductions in government expenditure began to take hold. Put simply, 
public policy exacerbated the slump. This view was shared by David Clark and 
Keith Hancock, both arguing that Australian economists’ advice was rather inept 
in the circumstances (Clark 1976; Hancock 1971). The Premiers’ Plan did not 
merely mimic the market but proved – in hindsight – needlessly deflationary 
(Hancock 1971, p. 77). Furthermore, the presumed reluctance to question 
deflationary policy in 1931 proved tragic, because the policy that stemmed from 
it was quite inappropriate. In terms of their assumptions and advice, Hancock 
judged that the economists had ‘performed badly’ (1971, p. 78). The steadfast 
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reluctance to experiment, to authorise even modest public sector stimulus, even 
when pressure on Australia’s foreign exchange eased, became starker by 1932. 
By that time Australia suffered an unemployment rate (28%) second only to 
Germany. The concerns of external balance and business confidence that 
preoccupied all the economists at the time were completely overlooked by David 
Clark in his traditional Keynesian retrospective of the episode (1976). 
A Reassessment 
Schedvin’s observation about the lack of heterodox economic opinion among 
Australian economists during the early 1930s can be refuted by briefly re-
examining their activities down to 1935, the year in which Schedvin’s original 
study ended. He completely overlooks, for instance, Copland and Giblin’s support 
for Keynes’s proposal to seek price level stabilisation, in the face of deflationary 
pressure, by resorting to cheap money and devaluation (Cain 1987a; Clark 1976; 
Endres 1987, p. 34). Neither does Schedvin discuss Keynes’s extensive review of 
the Premiers’ Plan encapsulated in his ‘Report of the Australian Experts’ (Keynes 
1973b, pp. 94-102). While it is true that Keynes felt there should be a little more 
domestic stimulation rather than relying upon another devaluation, his Australian 
contemporaries, in contrast, wanted a devaluation first to give some buffer for the 
external account before engaging in public spending. As Melville wryly recalls, 
Keynes’s refusal to sanction another devaluation of the Australian pound buttressed 
the central bank’s opposition to that expedient17. Consequently the increased public 
spending that the Wallace committee had at the back of their minds was dispelled. 
Undaunted, Copland and Giblin pressed the authorities to increase spending on 
public works. Giblin, inclined even in 1931 towards some limited public spending 
upon rural infrastructure, found more practical inspiration in Keynes’s (1933) 
pamphlet, The Means to Prosperity, with its message that an increase in 
expenditure would expand income rather than prices. He began to canvass that 
option among his colleagues. By 1935 Giblin had moved further, and expressed 
frustration at tampering directly with relative costs: ‘A mere cutting of cost involving 
the vicious cycle of reduced income and reduced employment, is now generally 
recognised as no solution to the problem but rather calculated to prolong and intensify 
depression’ (cited in Downing 1960, p. 45). In a confessional letter to the Sydney 
University economist, Ronald Walker, Giblin described how far his colleagues had 
come philosophically since 1930: ‘Dyason was the one firm and consistent 
inflationist. Copland went that way in waves, with strong back eddies…. Melville of 
course was a strong deflationist. Melville gradually and reluctantly has moved a very 
long way, but with always a hankering backward, which finds voice from time to 
time. Shann, more fitfully, has moved even further the same way; and with his 
regret’18. Copland candidly told the Premier of New South Wales, Bertram Stevens, 
whom he advised on economic policy, that his 1936 Harvard Oration – about how 
unfettered enterprise did not produce an economic and social order to satisfy the 
common man – was evidence of himself ‘moving still further to the left’.19 
In 1933 the General Manager of the Bank of New South Wales, Alfred 
Davidson, an active promoter of economics, had his research staff distribute a circular 
declaring that ‘deflation in Australia has reached a point at which it may be dangerous 
to continue’ (cited in Black 1995, p. 104). These actions, in tandem with the financial 
and political power of Davidson and Stevens, had some success in fortifying the Lyons 
Government against the Commonwealth Bank’s desire to issue public loans solely to 
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retire short-term debt. Had the Commonwealth Bank had its way, the ensuing tighter 
monetary conditions would have jeopardised the embryonic recovery. 
Schedvin’s reassessment of the worth of official economic policy during 
the depression is, moreover, at face value a little tendentious, for, as Forsyth noted, 
it is difficult to distinguish at times between the effect of policy and that of market 
forces, with each interacting on the other (1972, p. 376). As an example, take the 
exchange rate devaluation of January 1931, which, as Eichengreen argued, 
probably did more to aid the economic readjustment process than any other 
expedient (1988). Most would agree with Schedvin that it was indeed market forces 
that propelled cutting the link with sterling. That, however, is only half the story. 
The Commonwealth Bank, as guardian of the exchange rate, was quite prepared to 
use capital controls to uphold parity. It was Davidson who made the break, but with 
economists firmly by his side. Melville recalls that Shann, Copland and himself – 
all of them quite unencumbered in their counsel – spent a weekend at Davidson’s 
weekend retreat thrashing out the consequences of breaking the link with sterling20. 
Davidson, already instrumental in setting up the bank’s economic intelligence and 
research section, with his old friend Shann at its head, wanted to anticipate the 
market and be ‘in a position to influence events’21. That wish surely never became 
more apparent than in January 1931. How Schedvin, who was the very first to have 
access to the Bank of New South Wales’ archives, could overlook or disregard the 
role of economists in helping Davidson reach this crucial decision is quite 
mystifying. Schedvin was also the first scholar to exploit the Commonwealth Bank 
archival papers covering this period. Noel Butlin suggested that Schedvin had 
perhaps relied too much upon that archive, since his view on the proceedings of 
1931 resembled that of Sir Robert Gibson, namely, that economic policy barely 
mattered in all the drama (Butlin 1970, p. 55). Gibson’s successor as Chairman of 
the Commonwealth Bank Board, Claude Reading, was tarred with the same brush, 
attributing the recovery entirely to a revival in business confidence. ‘What can 
policies accomplish?’ he asked sceptically in one newspaper article.22 
Schedvin also argues that economic policy was too deflationary and too 
cautious and that perhaps more (though he rarely says what) could have been done 
to alleviate the slump. In the psychological and economic setting in which Australia 
was placed, there could be little recourse to public sector stimulation of the 
economy in the 1930s. The commitment to balance budgets, albeit over a three-year 
term, was invoked by the economists and policy-making authorities in a bid to 
restore business confidence. As Shann, Copland and, further afield, Keynes 
emphasised, there were ‘powerful psychological forces working in favour of 
deflation at the time...’ (Copland 1951, p. 21). Keynes had conceded that the 
success of fiscal policy depended upon how favourably it was seen by financial 
markets and the community. There could be, he said, ‘enormous psychological 
advantages in the appearance of economy’ (quoted in Middleton 1982, p. 56). In 
this respect, Keynes praised the restoration of Australian finances as readily as he 
had condemned their earlier profligacy (Markwell 1985, p. 19). Moreover, the guilt 
of the prodigal past hung in the air. Melville recalled that mere mention of a 
recurrence of 1920s-style public works sent ‘a shiver through people’s spines’23. 
Copland felt that ‘Australian governments had...shot their bolts before 1930 and so 
were in no position for bold initiatives’ (cited in Endres 1987, p. 21). In short, 
Australian governments could not turn to public borrowing to engage in what 
Keynes called ‘nature’s remedy’ to prevent a slump (Bland and Mills 1931, p. 162). 
Continuing deficit budgets, whether accidental or deliberate, were equated with 
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default. Australia’s foreign exchange reserves – the London balances – together 
with the repayment of overseas debt, precluded policy adventurism. 
Despite its severity, the business and financial community drew, therefore, 
enormous psychological relief from the Premiers’ Plan in the belief that it would 
rehabilitate Australia’s finances. Moreover, leaving it to market forces to engineer 
the same relative adjustments would not have triggered the same response but 
would, more likely, have drawn social resistance. In addition, higher tariff 
protection gave the Federal Government some latitude in deploying some public 
works without putting pressure upon the exchange rate (Arndt 1971). Sinclair 
argues that the higher protection, partly at the behest of Australian economists, was 
in defiance of ‘the rules of the game’ permitted by the Gold Standard. This action, 
together with the then heresy of devaluation, was at odds with Sir Otto Niemeyer’s 
advice that Australia should deflate its internal level of income to maintain parity 
with sterling (Sinclair 1974, p. 57). Copland likened a country on the Gold 
Standard to ‘a ship tied to an anchor in a rough sea’.24 The only option, then, was to 
cut free and ride the rough sea. 
Melville, who helped devise the Premiers’ Plan, rejected the Schedvin thesis 
and upheld the role of economists and the advice they gave to the Commonwealth 
Government. Their advice, he pointed out, not only prevented a breakdown of the 
monetary system but also played an important part in the recovery process (Cornish 
1993, p. 17): ‘The fact is that measures taken on wages, on the exchange rate, on 
budgets were the result of deliberate policy and were decisive in preventing the flight 
of capital and external default.’25 In short, the Australian authorities had choices 
facing them in 1931 and, importantly, exercised them. Wage levels, for instance, 
were cut by the Arbitration Court on the grounds of national interest even though the 
Court was quite sympathetic to the interests of the worker. It was Copland, too, who 
gave expert evidence before the Court on the necessity for a real wage cut. 
In his review of Schedvin’s book, Melville expressed further bemusement 
at the view that the rise of the manufacturing sector was almost accidental. An 
ensemble of measures, including tariff protection, devaluation, a reduction in 
money wages and easy money, most of which were sanctioned by the authorities, 
had a deliberately beneficial impact upon manufacturing (Melville 1971, p. 145). 
Melville, like Copland and Giblin, wanted to see more domestic manufacturing 
capacity in place and advised accordingly. 
Hancock noted that Schedvin’s study devoted relatively little attention to 
the intellectual activities of economists after 1935. This corresponds, of course, 
with the end date of Schedvin’s doctoral study. It did not prevent Schedvin, 
however, from asserting that little intellectual progression had been exhibited by 
Australian economists before 1939. However, even in the year Schedvin’s study 
concludes, an expansionist, proto-Keynesian ‘Sydney Plan’ was prepared for the 
NSW Premier by five economists: Ronald Walker, Richard Mills, Hermann Black, 
William Wentworth and Douglas Copland. The kernel of it had been circulating for 
some period beforehand with the intellectual activities of Copland and Giblin. 
Schedvin’s cut-off date means there is no detail, either, on the proceedings or the 
findings of the Royal Commission into Australia’s financial system of 1936/1937. 
At that forum, university economists were by far the most influential group giving 
evidence, and put forward an impressive case for having the federal government 
determine monetary policy instead of the central bank (Sutherlin 1980). After 
finding that the Commonwealth Bank had erred, both in opposing devaluation and 
in failing to expand credit quickly enough during the depression, the Commission 
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laid down policy guidelines with a Keynesian orientation.26 Melville, regarded by 
Groenewegen and McFarlane (1990, p. 143) as the most circumspect Keynesian of 
the four economists who concocted the Premier’s Plan, is insistent that most 
Australian economists had accepted the conceptual framework of the General 
Theory by 1939 (Cornish 1993, p. 19). At the monetary policy level, Gilbert (1973) 
discerns possible signs of ‘Keynesian’ economic management in Australia as early 
as 1938 when she insulated herself from the effects of the Roosevelt recession by 
taking pre-emptive monetary policy action. 
Conclusion 
The Schedvin-Copland debate about how effective economists and economic policy 
actually were in combating the depression has a critical bearing upon the reputation 
of Australian interwar economists. If one adopts the Schedvin view that economists 
were, despite their public profile, only minor players in formulating Australian 
economic policy during the early 1930s, it lends support to the view that the ideas 
of economists had little impact, except when their ideas were in tune with 
prevailing political currents. It is true that the influence of Australian economists 
certainly reached a high point in 1931 and then faded somewhat over the next few 
years as recovery took hold. It is also true that Copland and his colleagues extracted 
capital from the Premiers’ Plan, especially where it would promote the rising 
discipline of economics. Even in the lean years of the mid-thirties, Australian 
economists were a more imaginative and innovative force, in their conceptualising, 
advice and activities than Schedvin gave them credit for. They had to battle, too, 
against the stubborn and sometimes ultra-orthodox policies of the Commonwealth 
Bank Board, together with a government in the thrall of financial interests. 
Schedvin’s related judgement, that Australian economists never strayed far from 
the framework of the Premiers’ Plan, is a gross misrepresentation of both their 
vision and their intellectual hunger. Keynes believed that with the New Deal the 
United States was the economic laboratory for the world to test new economic 
doctrines. If one could overlook the special circumstances of the controversial 1931 
wage cut, perhaps Australia would have better deserved that title. The esteemed 
Australian historian, W.K. Hancock (1930), had noted the tendency of social and 
economic developments in Britain to shadow the course already mapped out in his 
own country. Keynes was made personally aware of this after making demands for 
his favourite statistician, Colin Clark, to return to Cambridge from a visiting 
lectureship at the University of Melbourne. Clark wrote back: ‘I am reaching the 
conclusion I want to stay in Australia. People have minds which are not closed to 
new truths, as the minds of so many Englishmen are: and with all the mistakes 
Australia has made in the past, I still think she may show the world, in 
economics...in the next twenty years’ (Keynes 1973b, p. 808). Clark followed this 
up with another apologetic letter informing Keynes that the opportunity of ‘putting 
economics into practice’ by advising the Queensland Premier was a job offer that 
even Keynes would think twice about (ibid., p. 801). 
________________________________ 
*  School of Management, Charles Sturt University, P.O. Box 588, Wagga Wagga, 
NSW 2678, Australia. Email: amillmow@csu.edu.au. An earlier version of this 
paper was given at the Fourteenth HETSA Conference at the University of 
Tasmania. I am indebted to those participants who commented on the paper and to 
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note of thanks to John King and Selwyn Cornish for comments on this paper. 
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